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"No one has the moral or legal right to
exhibit obscene movies."' This seems to be
a fundamental principle, yet much difficulty
has been encountered in attempting to enact
legislation to implement it. In William Gold-
man Theatres, Inc. v. Dana,2 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania indicated to the legis-
lature this difficulty of implementation by
striking down that state's Motion Picture
Control Act of September 17, 1.959 as un-
constitutional.
On two prior occasions3 the Pennsylvania
court had similarly condemned statutes
passed to protect the people "against the
flood of cinematic filth always pounding at
the borders of ... [the] Commonwealth." '4
The Motion Picture Censorship Act of May
15, 1915, as amended by the Act of May
8, 1929, 5 which prohibited the censorship
board from approving such films "as are
sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral,
or such as tend, in the judgment of the
board, to debase or corrupt morals,"6 was
struck down in 1956 as being too vague and
indefinite in its terms so as to offend the
due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.7 The same fate befell Section 4528
of the Pennsylvania Penal Code which pro-
hibited "the exhibition of fixed or moving
1 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405
Pa. 83, -, 173 A.2d 59, 70 (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961).
2 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
897 (1961).
3 Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417,
153 A.2d 227 (1959); Hallmark Prods., Inc. v.
Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
4 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 1 at -, 173 A.2d at 79 (dissenting opinion).
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 41-58 (1930).
6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (1930).
7 Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Carroll, supra note 3 at
-, 121 A.2d at 589.
pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, ob-
scene, indecent, or immoral nature and
character, or such as might tend to corrupt
morals. .. ."s The 1959 statute, declared
unconstitutional in the instant case, was en-
acted as a result of the two prior failures of
the state's attempts at censorship. The
wording of the statute is indicative of the
consideration given to numerous United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with
the problem. 9
The Pennsylvania statute 0 in the instant
case provided for a board of three members,
whose only qualification was that they be
residents of Pennsylvania." The board had
to be notified at least forty-eight hours prior
to any sale, lease, loan, exhibition or use
of any film.12 At any time after the first
showing of a film, the board, for the purpose
of review, could request that it be furnished
a copy of the film."3 The standard adopted
by the *act was: "The board shall have the
power to examine any film ... which shall
have been exhibited at least once ... in or-
der to determine whether such film... is
obscene or unsuitable for children.'1 4 The
terms are clearly defined in the statute in
what appears to be an obvious attempt by
the legislature to escape the "too vague and
indefinite" condemnation imposed upon
prior censorship statutes.' 5 These two cri-
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4528 (1945).
9 See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 70.1-.14 (Supp. 1960).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.2 (Supp. 1960).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.3 (Supp. 1960).
13 Ibid.
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.5 (Supp. 1960) (em-
phasis added).
15 Section 70.1, in defining the word "obscenity,"
adopted the definition as set out in the Roth case,
teria were the only grounds upon which a
film could be censored. A party receiving an
adverse finding of the board had the right
to demand a re-examination by the board in
his presence and, from this re-examination,
a right to appeal to a court of law. 16
The Court predicated its finding of un-
constitutionality on two bases. First, the act
violated the constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial in that it provided for a hearing
before the board members and not before an
impartial jury of the vicinage; second, the
act violated the constitutional prohibition
of prior restraint on communications. Re-
garding the first, the Court reasoned that the
statute was an expression of the common-
law crime of uttering an obscene state-
ment. 17 And since a crime was committed
the accused was entitled, not merely to a
board hearing as provided for in the act, but
to a trial by an impartial jury. The Court
predicated this right to jury trial on the
Pennsylvania constitution which states that
"trial by jury shall be as heretofore...
(i.e., it shall exist in all cases in which such
right existed prior to the constitution), and
i.e., if "to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to pruri-
ent [interests]," the film is "obscene." Roth v.
United States, supra note 9 at 489. This is the
accepted test of obscenity applied today. This sec-
tion goes on to define "unsuitable for children" to
mean "a film .. . which is obscene or which incites
to crime." "Incites to crime" is defined as "a film
...which represents or portrays as acceptable
conduct or as conduct worthy of emulation the
commission of any crime, or the manifesting of
contempt for law." It appears that the legislative
standard incorporated in this act is far from being
"too vague and indefinite."
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.9 (Supp. 1960).
17 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405
Pa. 83, -, 173 A.2d 59, 64, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
897 (1961); see Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa.
412 (1852), wherein defendant was convicted of
uttering obscene matters.
IS PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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which guarantees the accused, in a criminal
prosecution, a trial by jury.19 The second
basis for the decision was that the act vio-
lated the federal and state constitutional
prohibitions of prior restraint on communi-
cations, such violations being contrary to
the freedoms of speech and press. 20 The
majority bottomed this conclusion on Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson2' which
brought motion pictures into the realm of
the constitutional protections of freedom of
speech and press. Thus, something imping-
ing on these indispensable democratic free-
doms is violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the federal constitution and
article 1, section 7 of the Pennsylvania con-
stitution. The Court found that section 3 of
the act, requiring forty-eight hours notice
to the board before a film is shown, is an ex-
press prior restraint on the initial showing.
[S]ubsequent showings are likewise sub-
jected to previous restraint for the reason
that, if the motion picture is exhibited after
the censors have disapproved it, the exhibi-
tor may be criminally punished upon proof,
not of showing a picture that is obscene or
unsuitable for children, but merely upon
proof of showing a picture the exhibition of
which had been priorly restrained by the
administrative action of the Board oj
Censors.22
Both of these conclusions of the majority
1." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
20 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 61-64; see U.S. CONST.
amend. I; PA. CONST. art I, § 7.
Prior restraint is adequately defined as "admin-
istrative controls prior to any publication, such as
licensing or other devices according to which no
publication whatever may take place without
prior approval of a public official." William Gold-
man Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra note 17 at -,
173 A.2d at 69 (dissenting opinion).
21343 U.S. 495 (1952).
22 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 64.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
opinion were attacked in two dissenting
opinions. They interpreted the act as simply
establishing a system of administrative con-
trol, rather than creating a penal sanction.
The act, according to the dissents, is analo-
gous to the Pennsylvania Liquor Code and
other administrative provisions which allow
a commissioner or a board to make findings
and levy penalties for violations of statutes
in issue and which make no provision for a
trial by jury.23 On the issue of prior restraint,
the dissents pointed out that it was recog-
nized in Near v. Minnesota24 that freedom
of speech and press are not absolute rights
and may be subject to prior restraint in
certain limited areas. While thus finding that
prior restraint per se is not a violation of
either the federal or state constitution, the
dissents stressed that the act does not, in
fact, impose a prior restraint. It was their
contention that the requirement of an initial
showing before the board can view the film
renders the issue of prior restraint moot.
25
The validity of administrative tribunals
has long been recognized. The appointment
of a board, commission or commissioner to
determine both questions of law and fact
is an essential part of our administrative
procedure. 26 The Pennsylvania Motion Pic-
ture Control Act simply created an admin-
istrative board. In so doing, the legislature
did not violate any constitutional guaran-
tees.27 The legislature may create new
23 Id. at -, 173 A.2d at 76 (dissenting opinion);
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 9-902
(1951). See especially § 7-741 which prescribes
the duty of the board.
24 283 U.S. 691, 716 (1931).
25 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 71-76 (dissenting
opinion).
26 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 1.01 (2d ed.
1959).
27 A statute authorizing an administrative tribunal
to hear claims against a municipal corporation
offenses and prescribe the mode of ascer-
taining the guilt of those violating them
without providing for a jury trial.28 The
existence of administrative tribunals is
predicated upon this legislative preroga-
tive. And since the guarantee of trial by
jury extends only to criminal proceedings
and to those common-law offenses existing
prior to the constitution,2 9 the right to trial
by jury is not violated in an administrative
hearing. The act was apparently not in-
tended to be a penal law, but merely
administrative legislation passed to fulfill
an immediate need of the people of Penn-
sylvania. The purpose of such an act is to
secure decency and morality in the motion
picture industry, a purpose which falls
within the police power of the state. 0 The
welfare of the state demands that every
effort be made to sustain such legislation.
The majority opinion, for reasons not
apparent, overlooked the legislature's obvi-
was held valid under the seventh amendment be-
cause the proceeding was "not in the nature of a
suit at common law." Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. City
of Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537 (1899).
28 Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Brei-
tinger, 250 Pa. 225, -, 95 Atil. 433, 438 (1915).
See Commonwealth ex rel. McClain v. Locke, 72
Pa. 491 (1873) wherein Judge Agnew comments:
"What is more common than to appoint commis-
sioners under a law to determine things upon the
decision of which the act is to operate in one
way or another?... [T]ake the case of granting
a license to keep an inn and sell liquor. The judge
determines whether the license is necessary, and
if not necessary, the law says to the applicant,
'No license.' The law takes effect just as the judge
determines, yet who says it is the court that legis-
lates? ... [T]he true distinction, I conceive, is
this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power
to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend." Id. at 498.
29 PA. CONSi". art. 1, §§ 6, 9.
30 Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Il. 251, -, 87
N.E. 1011, 1013 (1909).
ous attempt at escaping condemnation of
the act on grounds of prior restraint. The
opinion failed to recognize how section
70.7, providing for one showing before the
board could censor a film, avoided the con-
stitutional bar of prior restraint. The Court,
citing Times Film Corp. v. City of Chi-
cago3' and Near v. Minnesota,3 2 conceded
that not all prior restraint is unconstitu-
tional and recognized the need for certain
exceptions. While the issue of prior re-
straint formed the basis of the majority
opinion, the dissents recognized that the act
31365 U.S. 43 (1961).
32 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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made such a discussion an unrelated issue.
The legislature was aware of this problem,
and had attempted to escape involvement
by providing for an initial showing prior to
a board determination.
The difficulties involved in enacting cen-
sorship statutes are very apparent in the
instant case. The Pennsylvania legislature
took precautions to avoid the constitutional
pitfalls to which similar legislation had
fallen victim- yet the act was stricken
down. An inescapable question has thus
been created: What guides can a legislature
utilize when drafting censorship statutes so
as to be reasonably certain that the courts
will sustain them?
Textbooks for Parochial Schools
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the
recent case of Dickman v. School Dist. No.
62C,1 was called upon to decide the con-
stitutionality of a statute which stated that:
[E]ach district school board shall .. .pro-
vide textbooks, prescribed or authorized by
law, for the free and equal use of all pupils
residing in its district and enrolled in and
actually attending standard elementary
schools .... 2
In accord with this statute public funds
were expended to provide textbooks, for
students in both public and parochial
schools. A taxpayer sought to enjoin a
school board "from supplying textbooks
without charge for the use of pupils en-
rolled in ... a parochial school .... ,,3 The
Court held that this expenditure was for-
'-Ore. -, 366 P.2d 532 (1961).
2 ORE. REV. STAT. § 337.150(1) (1957).
3 Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, - Ore.-,
336 P.2d 533, 534-35 (1961).
bidden by the Oregon constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury for the benefit of any religeous
[sic], or theological institution. .... -4
The Dickman decision illustrates the
conflict which often arises when legislation
aimed at benefiting education indirectly
confers a benefit upon sectarian institu-
tions. In the past, courts have upheld such
legislation by relying on either the "re-
muneration" or the "child benefit" theory.
According to the "remuneration" 5 the-
4 ORE. CONST. art. I, § 5.
5 St. Hedwig's Industrial School for Girls v. Cook
County, 289 111. 432, -, 124 N.E. 629, 631 (1919);
Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers, 197
Okla. 249,-, 171 P.2d 600, 601-03 (1946); State
ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251,-, 176
N.W. 224, 228 (1920). The Murrow case distin-
guished the cases based on a remuneration theory
from those involving the use of public money to
provide transportation for pupils to parochial
schools on the ground that in the latter cases
the state received no value for its money. But see
Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d
1002 (1941).
